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Out of Sight, Out of Mind?  Why the Lanham 
Act Needs to be Brought Into the Digital 
Millennium 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Congress has often been slow when adapting existing 
trademark law to emerging technologies.
1
  When attempting to apply tradi-
tional trademark law definitions in the context of the Internet, websites, and 
search engines, uniformity has been rare, and is applied with wildly incon-
sistent results.  One of the biggest areas of confusion, and the area most 
likely to be abused, is the use of a trademark as a meta tag
2
 in a website 
owned by someone other than the mark’s owner.  In the context of meta 
tags, several Circuits have given the Lanham Act
3
 distinctive application 
that contradicts application in other Circuits; therefore, winning or losing a 
meta tag trademark claim could be determined not by the language of the 
statute, but instead by the court exercising jurisdiction over the case. 
This Comment provides a brief overview of trademark law as specifi-
cally applied in the context of the Internet, and also looks at the substantial 
differences in how that law is applied in various jurisdictions.  Part I of the 
Comment briefly discusses the protections offered by the Lanham Act.  
Part II discusses the Lanham Act as applied to the Internet, specifically in 
the context of website meta tags.  Part III discusses how recent decisions 
have ruled on the buying and selling of keywords.  Part IV discusses recent 
rulings on using trademarked terms as meta tags.  Finally, Part V discusses 
potential changes to the Lanham Act and its application to keywords to 
make it more effective in the context of digital protection. 
 
 1. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (addressing 
Congress’ and the states’ slow response to cyber-squatters (individuals who attempt to regis-
ter domain names of an already existing trademark)). 
 2. Meta tags are the portion of the underlying HTML code of a website and “are in-
tended to describe the contents of the web site.”  Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t 
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006). 
1
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I.  TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN GENERAL 
The function of granting trademark protection is purely an economic 
one, with consistent commercial use of a mark giving equal economic ben-
efit to both the trademark holder and consumers.
4
  The Lanham Act seeks 
to protect consumers by preventing someone other than a trademark owner 
from use that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.”5 
However, little uniformity exists in defining “likelihood of confu-
sion,” as the circuit courts have applied various definitions and determining 
factors when addressing the issue.  After decades of varying definitions of 
“likelihood of confusion,” a commonly applied test emerged from the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats.6  The Sleekcraft 
court combined previous case law to formulate a thorough, if not exhaus-
tive,
7
 list of factors to consider in infringement cases between competing 
goods: 
1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the 
marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type 
of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. 
the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion 
of the product lines.
8
  
 
 4. By allowing a company to easily distinguish its products by a brand or trade name, 
the producers of that product save the costs of further distinguishing that product.  In turn, 
consumers of that product have a reduced cost in searching for products that have consistent 
qualities over time.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Econom-
ic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–69 (1987) (“‘I need not investigate the attributes 
of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me 
that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”).  In one sense, 
trademarks are self-enforcing as they gain value when “they denote consistent quality, and a 
firm has an incentive to develop a trademark only if it is able to maintain consistent quali-
ty.”  Id. at 270. 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 6. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) abrogated in 
part on other grounds by Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 7. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348 n.11.  Other jurisdictions have taken this non-
exhaustive language to heart and added their own non-statutory requirement—namely, the 
infringing use must have occurred without the plaintiff’s consent.  See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. 
v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005).  The Second Circuit did not ex-
pound why a plaintiff would seek damages on trademark infringement that it had previously 
consented to. 
 8. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348–49.  The sliding hierarchy of trademark strength, rang-
ing from generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful, is best laid out in Aber-
2
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Under the Lanham Act, use “in commerce” is the threshold determina-
tion,
9
 as non-commercial use does not violate the language of the act.  But 
even consistently deciding what the words of the Lanham Act itself mean 
has been difficult for the circuit courts.  Some circuits read the statute’s re-
quirement of “use in commerce” as one factor, while other jurisdictions 
have separated “use” and “in commerce” into independent factors.10 
Even if commercial use of a trademark is established, a would-be in-
fringer can still plead fair use as a defense, as the Lanham Act explicitly 
carves out an exception for use that is “descriptive of and used fairly and in 
good faith only to describe the goods or services” 11 represented by a valid 
mark.
12
  Alleged infringers asserting a statutory, or “classic fair use” de-
 
crombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).  The strongest 
mark is one that is “inherently distinctive” in an “arbitrary or fanciful” manner.  Id. at 11.  A 
generic mark is “inherently weak” and is afforded the lowest protection.  Rodeo Collection, 
Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 1987).  Registration of a mark with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office is prima facie evidence that a mark is not gener-
ic.  15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006). 
  Proximity refers to the relatedness of the goods.  Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350.  This 
factor aims to prevent the public from mistakenly assuming “an association between the 
producers of the related goods, though no such association exists.”  Id. 
  Similarity is tested on three factors (sight, sound, and meaning), which “must be 
considered as they are encountered in the marketplace.”  Id. at 351. 
  While evidence of actual confusion will strengthen the claim of infringement, ab-
sence of such proof “is not dispositive against a trademark plaintiff, because actual confu-
sion is hard to prove; difficulties in gathering evidence of actual confusion make its absence 
generally unnoteworthy.”  Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1050 (9th Cir. 1999). 
  Despite limitless variances on how the Internet could be used for marketing, the In-
ternet as a whole has been considered one “marketing channel.”  See Internet Specialties W. 
v. Milon-Digiornio Enters., 559 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2009). 
  Courts look at whether a “typical buyer exercising ordinary caution” would think 
the goods are so similar as to be related.  Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353. 
  The Sleekcraft court left the intent analysis listed as the seventh factor to a good 
faith determination.  Id. at 354. 
  In discussing the likelihood of expansion factor, the Sleekcraft court explained, “In-
asmuch as a trademark owner is afforded greater protection against competing goods, a 
‘strong possibility’ that either party may expand his business to compete with the other will 
weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing.”  Id. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1) (2006). 
 10. Compare 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281–82 
(D.N.J. 2006) (considering use in commerce as one individual factor), with PETA v. 
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) (looking at “use” and “in commerce” as indi-
vidual factors in trademark infringement). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (b)(4). 
 12. Statutory fair use has come to be known as “classic fair use.”  See, e.g., Toyota Mo-
tor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1183 n.11 (9th Cir. 2010). 
3
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fense, are usually subjected to a likelihood-of-confusion test similar to the 
one laid out in Sleekcraft.
13
 
But the Ninth Circuit further muddied the waters of fair use when it 
created a non-statutory affirmative defense to trademark violation known as 
“nominative fair use”14—“a use that does not imply sponsorship or en-
dorsement of the product because the mark is used only to describe the 
thing, rather than to identify its source.”15  If an alleged trademark infringer 
asserts a nominative fair use defense, the Sleekcraft factors are no longer 
used because the mark used will not just be similar, it will be identical to 
the plaintiff’s mark.16  Instead, likelihood of confusion in nominative fair 
use is subjected to a three-prong test: (1) the product in question must not 
be readily identifiable without use of the mark; (2) the alleged infringer 
used only so much of the mark as reasonably necessary to identify the 
product or service; and (3) the user must do nothing that would suggest en-
dorsement by the trademark owner.
17
 
In creating the nominative fair use defense, the Ninth Circuit drastical-
ly changed trademark litigation by giving would-be infringers another 
method of attempting to avoid liability.  As such, the idea of nominative 
fair use has been applied in vastly different ways by different circuit courts.  
In the Ninth Circuit, nominative fair use has given rise to a further differen-
tiated likelihood-of-confusion analysis.
18
  The Third Circuit, however, has 
held that nominative fair use is not substantially different than the tradi-
tional trademark fair use doctrine, and is treated as a prima facie defense to 
infringement.
19
  Further confusing the issue, other circuits have adopted on-
ly portions of the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use test, while others have 
simply rejected the test altogether.
20
 
 
 13. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 14. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 15. Id. at 306. 
 16. Playboy, 279 F.3d at 801 (stating that application of the Sleekcraft factors to identi-
cally used meta tags “would lead to the incorrect conclusion that virtually all nominative 
uses are confusing”). 
 17. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
 18. See Playboy, 279 F.3d at 806 (holding that nominative use of a trademark should be 
given the same exception to the Lanham Act as comparative uses of a mark). 
 19. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 226 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he burden of proving likelihood of confusion, even in a nominative use case, 
should remain with the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 20. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S&M Brands, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (E.D. 
Va. 2009) (noting the Fourth Circuit has not adopted the nominative fair use test “in any 
form”); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998) (adopt-
ing the Ninth Circuit’s test in part). 
4
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As trademark infringement became more and more common in the 
context of Internet commerce, the Ninth Circuit again further differentiated 
trademark litigation by further narrowing application of its Sleekcraft fac-
tors, settling on the “controlling troika”21 of similarity of the marks, relat-
edness of the goods or services, and use of the same marketing channels as 
the three most important factors in analyzing likelihood of confusion in the 
context of the Internet.  However, initial application of the “controlling 
troika” still dealt with more traditional trademark issues, just in the context 
of the Internet—similarity of logos used in a display,22 or textual presenta-
tion of trademarks in website URLs.
23
 
While other courts have adopted either the “controlling troika” or 
some similar variant based on the Ninth Circuit’s likelihood-of-confusion 
test, the Ninth Circuit recently changed its own analysis in its 2011 ruling 
in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.
24
  The 
Network Automation decision is likely to further confuse the likelihood-of-
confusion analysis, as the court drastically scaled back its reliance on the 
“controlling troika,” going so far as to say that the “troika” factors are a 
“particularly poor fit” on the issue of search engine trademark keyword 
use.
25
  
Instead of focusing on those three Sleekcraft factors, the Ninth Circuit 
said that courts must be flexible when applying Sleekcraft since, “Depend-
ing on the facts of each specific case arising on the Internet, other factors 
may arise as more illuminating on the question of consumer confusion.”26  
The court effectively eliminated the necessity of looking at the marketing 
channels when it stated that since nearly every business uses the Internet as 
a marketing channel, “the shared use of a ubiquitous marketing channel 
does not shed much light on the likelihood of consumer confusion.”27  Fi-
nally, the court added a ninth consideration of “other relevant factors,” such 
as how the resulting keyword search results were labeled or displayed.
28
  
Given the recency of this decision, its impact on subsequent litigation is 
likely to further the judicial inconsistencies in applying the Lanham Act as 
other circuits tweak their own analyses. 
 
 21. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 22. See id. at 1206. 
 23. See Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 24. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 25. Id. at 1148. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1151. 
 28. Id. at 1153–54. 
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II.  OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND? 
For the most part, obvious trademark violations on the Internet are 
easily regulated with “traditional” Lanham Act application—putting anoth-
er company’s trademarked logo on your website to promote your products 
would be a violation on the Internet just as it would in a print advertise-
ment.
29
  But an emerging issue out of Internet commerce is the use of 
trademarks in generating search results on a web search engine in an at-
tempt to direct end users to a particular website.  Whether these practices 
constitute “use in commerce” has been widely debated, with different juris-
dictions coming to different conclusions.
30
 
Search engines such as Google generate results in two main ways: 
search term relevance and context-based advertising,
31
 neither of which is 
immediately apparent to users performing the search.  Search term rele-
vance is how a “traditional” search engine query operates.  For example, if 
a prospective consumer is looking for the goods or services of a particular 
provider, they can enter that provider’s trademark into the search engine.32  
The search engine then uses its own method (in Google’s case, a proprie-
tary algorithm)
33
 to deliver results in a decreasing order of relevance.
34
  The 
more often a particular keyword is listed as a meta tag in the underlying 
source code for a website, the more likely that website is to show up in a 
search for that particular word.
35
  After searching for a particular trademark 
on a website, a search engine will produce a list of results with the owner 
of that mark at or near the top, allowing the consumer to go directly to that 
producer’s web site.36 
Context-based advertising allows websites to bypass their “natural” 
placement in a traditional search and purchase priority on specific key-
words to make their site more visible.
37
  Search engines “sell” these key-
word advertisements to the highest bidder,
38
 a practice known as “trade-
 
 29. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 30. See infra notes 45–47. 
 31. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Since each search engine uses its own method of retrieving “hits” on a keyword, 
results on a keyword will vary based on which search engine is being used.  Brookfield 
Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 125. 
 38. Id. at 126.  The plaintiff suing Google in Rescuecom suggested that the search en-
gine company generates 97% of its revenue through selling keywords (both trademarked 
and non-trademarked.)  See id. 
6
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mark keying.”39  When a consumer does a search on a trademarked term, 
the search engines may place advertisements alongside the “traditional” re-
sults.
40
  But these advertisements are more than just advertisements, as they 
also represent a link to the advertiser’s website regardless of whether the 
advertiser is the owner of the trademark term that was searched for.
41
  The 
end result could be a consumer looking for Company A’s trademark being 
directed to Company B’s web site simply because Company B paid for bet-
ter placement on Company A’s trademark through the use of a “Sponsored 
Link.”42 
The Lanham Act implications of each of these practices have been ad-
dressed by various courts, often involving the search engine Google, with a 
consensus of the “law of the land” difficult to establish.43 
III.  THE RARE BRIGHT LINE: SUGGESTING TRADEMARKED TERMS 
VIOLATES THE LANHAM ACT, BUT WHAT ABOUT SIMPLE BUYING AND 
SELLING? 
Trademark infringement suits over context-based advertising have be-
come more common in recent years, with legal rulings being inconsistent 
and often reaching different conclusions on different analyses of different 
points of law.
44
  In Government Employees’ Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc. 
the court ruled that defendant search engines Google and Overture’s prac-
tice of selling GEICO’s trademark for advertisement was use in commerce. 
45
  However, in Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting,
46
 the court 
ruled that since the trademarked word was not visibly displayed in the ad-
 
 39. Terrance J. Keenan, American and French Perspectives on Trademark Keying: The 
Courts Leave Businesses Searching for Answers, 2 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 14, ¶ 1 
(2005). 
 40. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 125–26. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537–38 (E.D. Va. 
2010). 
 43. See infra Part IV. 
 44. See generally Travis Burchart, The Keyword Plot Thickens as the Internet Troika 
Suffers Its Demise at the Hands of the Sleekcraft Factors: Ninth Circuit Addresses Confu-
sion and Keywords, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK L. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 12:03 AM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/copyright-trademarklaw/blogs/copyrightand 
trademarklawblog/default.aspx. 
 45. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 46. Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y 
2006). 
7
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vertising that was seen by consumers, purchasing a trademarked term 
owned by another company did not qualify as use in commerce.
47
 
The Second Circuit’s 2009 ruling in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, 
Inc.
48
 may have signaled a shift in how some courts will handle trademark 
keying.  In Rescuecom, a computer repair company sued the search engine 
company after several of Rescuecom’s competitors began buying advertis-
ing space in Google’s search results using Rescuecom’s trademark—at 
Google’s suggestion.49  When bringing suit on the same issue that was pre-
sented in Merck, Rescuecom took a different tactical route from the Merck 
plaintiffs by bringing suit not against the individual infringers but instead 
bringing action directly against Google
50—helping to ensure the court 
would be forced to address the “display” problem since Google directly 
displayed Rescuecom’s trademark in its Keyword Suggestion Tool.51  The 
strategy worked, as the court ruled that Google’s selling, and a competitor’s 
buying, of a trademarked keyword “fits literally within the terms specified 
by” the Lanham Act’s definition of “use in commerce.”52  However, the 
Rescuecom court failed to directly address whether simply using a trade-
mark as a meta tag in a web site’s source code would qualify as “use in 
commerce” without the buying and selling of the word.53  In the aftermath 
of the ruling, Google has since changed its policies on suggesting trade-
marked terms.
54
 
Rescuecom’s outcome has been very narrowly applied, and Google 
has recently had its AdWords feature of selling trademarked keywords up-
held in another jurisdiction.  In Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., the 
search engine was allowed to continue selling trademarked words, despite 
that sale being viewed as occurring “in commerce.”55  
 
 47. Id. at 415.  In this decision, the court only considered the use by the company using 
the trademarked keyword in an advertisement, and not the initial “sale” of the keyword to 
that company. 
 48. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 49. Google’s advertising service is known as AdWords.  One feature of AdWords is the 
Keyword Suggestion Tool, which recommends keywords for an advertiser to use based on 
the advertiser’s specified market.  Several of Rescuecom’s competitors purchased the key-
word “Rescuecom” after it had been suggested to them by Google’s Keyword Suggestion 
Tool.  Id. at 125–27. 
 50. Id. at 123. 
 51. Id. at 127. 
 52. Id. at 129.  The Ninth Circuit stated its own adoption of this “use in commerce” 
view in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 53. See generally Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 123. 
 54. Google Inc. Advertising Program Terms, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/ 
permissions/guidelines.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2011). 
 55. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 540 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
8
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In applying the Fourth Circuit’s own version of its “likelihood of con-
fusion” test56 (different from the Sleekcraft factors), the district court held 
that consumer confusion was unlikely when third parties selling counterfeit 
Rosetta Stone products used Rosetta Stone’s trademark in their advertise-
ments.
57
  In its defense, Google’s only contention was that it did not use the 
mark in a manner that would confuse consumers as to the source or origin 
of goods.
58
  The court only analyzed three of the confusion factors: 
Google’s intent, actual confusion, and the consuming public’s sophistica-
tion.
59
 
When addressing Google’s intent, the court drew a fine-line distinc-
tion between Google’s intent to profit from using the trademark and 
Google’s intent to confuse the public about the origin of the trademark.60  
The court further stated that in this instance, confusing the public would be 
more detrimental to Google than it would be to Rosetta Stone, as Google’s 
entire business depends on users finding Google’s services reliable and 
trustworthy.
61
  Finally, the court ruled that Google had no intent to purpose-
fully point customers to counterfeit service providers.
62
  Ultimately, the 
court stated this factor was definitively in Google’s favor.63 
Both Google and Rosetta Stone argued that actual evidence of con-
sumer confusion as to a source of a good was the most important factor and 
best evidence of likelihood of confusion.
64
  However, the district court 
quickly dismissed Rosetta Stone’s testimonies from five customers as de 
minimis, as those testimonies resulted from more than 100,000 impressions 
over six years.
65
 
The district court’s most noticeable departure from traditional “likeli-
hood of confusion” analysis based on Sleekcraft appears in its self-created 
 
 56. In the Fourth Circuit, likelihood of consumer confusion is determined by: (1) 
strength or distinctiveness of the mark; (2) similarity of the marks to consumers; (3) similar-
ity of the goods and services identified with the marks; (4) similarity between the facilities 
used by the markholders; (5) similarity of advertising; (6) defendant’s intent; (7) actual con-
fusion; (8) quality of the defendant’s product; (9) sophistication of the consuming public.  
George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 57. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 544. 
 58. See id. at 541. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 541. 
 61. Id. at 542. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 543.  The district court relied on George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t 
Ltd., 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009), where the Fourth Circuit ruled that four instances of con-
fusion among 500,000 instances failed to establish confusion. 
9
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prong of analyzing the “consuming public’s sophistication.”66  The court 
specifically disavowed Rosetta Stone’s contention that the relevant market 
to consider is the public at large—instead, the court looked only at potential 
buyers of Rosetta Stone’s products.67  Since Rosetta Stone’s products cost 
hundreds of dollars and is targeted specifically at “well-educated consum-
ers willing to invest money and energy in the time-intensive task of learn-
ing a language,”68 the district court ruled that those same consumers would 
have the “expertise and sophistication”69 necessary to be able to distinguish 
paid advertisements
70
 and natural results on the search engine.  Therefore, 
the consuming public’s sophistication strongly favored Google.71 
While the district court’s decision on likelihood of confusion was 
enough to support its decision to grant Google’s motion for summary 
judgment, the district court took an unexpected turn by applying another, 
and seemingly unrelated, trademark principle to Google’s selling of trade-
marked terms.  The district court held that Google’s use of trademarked 
keywords should be upheld by the functionality doctrine,
72
 which “prevents 
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s 
reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a 
producer to control a useful product feature.”73  The court reasoned that 
since courts have found search engines to be a valuable information pro-
vider,
74
 allowing trademark holders such as Rosetta Stone to prohibit 
search engines such as Google from selling their trademark would limit le-
gitimate competition.
75
 
 
 66. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 540. 
 67. Id. at 545. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 545. 
 70. Not all of Google’s Sponsored Links are labeled as such. 
 71. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 545. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).  Another leading 
functionality doctrine case, Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., further held 
that courts must consider whether a product feature is essential to the use or purpose of the 
device.  Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mkt’g Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
 74. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 75. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 545.  It is worth noting that the court explicitly 
viewed using a trademarked keyword in natural search results and allowing Google to sell 
those trademarked terms to someone other than the trademark owner as exactly the same.  
Id. at 546. 
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IV.  WHAT ABOUT GENERAL USE OF META TAGS? 
Not surprisingly, circuit courts are also split on whether using a 
trademarked term as a meta tag to generate “natural” search results should 
be considered a “use in commerce,” or if it should be protected by some 
other affirmative defense.  The Ninth Circuit initially ruled that using meta 
tags that were confusingly similar to a trademarked term created initial in-
terest confusion and therefore was an infringing use.
76
  However, the Ninth 
Circuit backed down from such a definitive stance in Playboy Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Welles, by ruling that use of a trademark as a meta tag would be 
commercial use, but such use would definitively fall under nominative fair 
use
77
 because would-be infringers would have no way to identify them-
selves without using the trademark for context.
78
  The court further ruled 
that such contextualized use would only cease being nominative fair use if 
the would-be infringers used the meta tags in such a manner that their web-
site would regularly appear above the trademark owner’s website in 
searches for the trademarked term.
79
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in North American Medical Corp. v. 
Axiom Worldwide provided a narrower contrast to the Playboy ruling by 
returning to the rationale laid out in Brookfield.
80
  In North American Med-
ical, defendant Axiom used North American Medical’s trademarked prod-
uct line as a meta tag in promotion of its website, where Axiom sold its 
competing product.
81
  In upholding the lower court’s ruling that use of a 
trademarked term as a meta tag was “use in commerce” under the plain 
meaning of the Lanham Act, the court ruled that use of a trademark as a 
meta tag on a competitor’s web site was enough to demonstrate likelihood 
of source confusion
82
 when the search engine results presents the competi-
 
 76. Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 77. Playboy, 279 F.3d at 803. 
 78. In Playboy, defendant Welles was a former Playboy Playmate of the Year, and re-
peatedly identified herself as such on her website, both in visible text and in meta tags.  Id. 
at 799.  The court ruled that Welles’ inability to use the term “Playmate of the Year” would 
be particularly damaging to the validity of search results because there was no descriptive 
substitute available for Welles’ use.  Id. at 802.  Such search difficulty would result in “the 
unwanted effect of hindering the free flow of information on the [I]nternet.”  Id. at 803–04. 
 79. Id. at 804. 
 80. N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1220, 1222 (11th 
Cir. 2008). 
 81. Id. at 1216–17. 
 82. Id. at 1220, 1222.  The court explained that a competitor’s use of trademarked meta 
tags to generate search results would be likely to confuse consumers since a search engine 
query for the trademark would generate the competitor’s website as well as the trademark 
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tor’s website in a manner that suggests that the two products come from the 
same source.
83
 
V.  MOVING FORWARD: CHANGING THE LANHAM ACT FOR THE DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM 
To eliminate further confusion from the vastly different ways the Lan-
ham Act is applied in the context of the Internet, Congress should revise 
the trademark law to bring it in line with the reality of digital trademark in-
fringement.  By clarifying key provisions—most importantly establishing a 
bright-line rule on meta tag use—Congress can keep countless lawsuits 
from the federal court systems while strengthening the underlying spirit of 
the Lanham Act. 
When updating the Lanham Act to specifically address the Internet 
and meta tags, Congress must be cognizant of the massive scope of these 
proposed changes and the tremendous difficulty in trying to enforce new 
laws if written too narrowly.  Keeping that in mind, an outright ban on us-
ing a trademarked keyword as a meta tag in HTML code would prove to be 
entirely too cumbersome for courts to regulate—primarily due to the ease 
of changing HTML code to remove meta tags at a moment’s notice, along 
with the widespread non-infringing, non-commercial use present on the In-
ternet.  To make an outright ban effective, any change to the legislation 
would also have to make a statutory definition of what type of website au-
tomatically qualifies as a “commercial” website, or at least a statutory defi-
nition of “commercial”84—mere presence in search results could not be a 
legitimate basis for commercial determination, as search engines routinely 
return web sites in search results that do not have the exact key word that 
was searched for as a meta tag. 
However, the buying and selling of trademarked meta tags would be 
much easier for Congress to define as commercial use—and could there-
fore eliminate both the “classic fair use” and “nominative fair use” defenses 
 
holder’s website, falsely suggesting some affiliation or relationship between the two—what 
has been called “source confusion.”  Id. at 1222 n.9. 
 83. The court narrowly tailored its decision, explicitly stating that it was not ruling on 
basic search engine results triggered by trademarked meta tags.  Id. at 1224 n.10.  While the 
court did not take an official ruling on the issue in the opinion, it did hint that such use 
might be allowable.  See id. at 1224 n.10. 
 84. Under the Lanham Act, “commercial” is not defined at all, and “commerce” is 
merely defined as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2006). 
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from trademark keying.
85
  Analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s likelihood of con-
fusion factors as laid out in Sleekcraft,
86
 and putting them in the context of 
meta tag use shows that banning the buying and selling of trademarked me-
ta tags would be a reinforcement of, not be a shift in, existing likelihood of 
confusion policy.  A statutory ban on buying and selling trademarked key-
words would be in line with the already existing intent of the Lanham Act’s 
likelihood of confusion requirement—an intent that is enforced with very 
little uniformity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
87
 
Until such legislative steps can be taken by Congress, federal courts 
should re-evaluate traditional Sleekcraft application, and disregard those 
factors that aren’t applicable in the Internet marketplace.  By looking at 
each factor anew, courts can reduce the number of factors to be considered 
and give more clear-cut guidance to lower courts. 
A. Strength of the Mark 
The context of the Internet and search engines does nothing to limit 
the sufficiency of the traditional strength of mark analysis in determining 
likelihood of confusion.  The sliding scale in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc.
88
 is no more or less applicable in the context of the In-
ternet than in “traditional” application, despite the fact that to be used as a 
meta tag, only the textual representation of the trademark would be used.
89
  
Studies suggest that users defer to Google’s search results as authoritative 
when seeing a website listed in search results even when the presentation of 
the website in the results indicate decreased relevance.
90
  That deference to 
Google or another search engine is more damaging to consumers who rely 
on the search engine to provide accurate information regarding the source 
of the trademarked keyword on which they are basing their search. 
 
 85. Since each keyword would be bought and sold in a commercial transaction, the ar-
guments of such use being “descriptive” would no longer apply.  See supra notes 11, 13, 
and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra note 8. 
 87. See supra Part I. 
 88. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 89. Meta tags must be text-based, as the underlying code for all web sites is text data.  
Even a visual representation of a trademark (such as the world-famous Disney “Mouse 
Ears”) is implemented through lines of text that refer to the graphic file. 
 90. See Bing Pan et al., In Google We Trust: Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, and 
Relevance, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM’N 3, article 3 (2007), available at 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue3/pan.html. 
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B. Proximity of the Goods 
Similar to the strength of mark analysis, no additional considerations 
need to be factored into the proximity of goods analysis.  As discussed in 
Rescuecom and Rosetta Stone,
91
 most trademark keying cases result from 
direct competitors attempting to divert competing traffic towards their own 
website.  Codifying a definition of “proximity” or “competing” would be 
difficult, so traditional proximity analysis would continue to suffice. 
C. Similarity of the Marks and Intent to Cause Confusion 
To establish a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff needs to estab-
lish that a defendant is using a mark that is “confusingly similar” to the 
protected mark.
92
  However, in the majority of Internet search engine cases, 
such as Rescuecom and Rosetta Stone, the similarity of the marks being 
used is not disputed as the defendants typically are using the exact same 
mark,
93
 which easily satisfies the “confusingly similar” requirement.94  
Therefore, in the context of Internet search engines and meta tags, similari-
ty of the marks, especially when the exact same trademark is used, is highly 
relevant in analyzing trademarked keyword use. 
Further, use of the exact trademark as a keyword should also serve as 
prima facie evidence of the seventh Sleekcraft factor, intent to cause confu-
sion.  One can hardly fathom a company copying another company’s exact 
trademark logo and claiming such behavior was unintentional.
95
  The same 
rationale should apply in the Internet setting with text-based trademarks. 
 
 91. See supra notes 47–52, 54–66 and accompanying text. 
 92. Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 93. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (establish-
ing that Google had sold plaintiff Rescuecom’s exact trademark to Rescuecom’s competi-
tors); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538–39  (E.D. Va. 2010) (es-
tablishing that Google had sold plaintiff Rosetta Stone’s exact trademark as part of its 
AdWords program). 
 94. Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that using the exact trademark in question as a meta tag satisfies the Lanham Act’s “confus-
ingly similar” requirement). 
 95. Imagine a company trying to use the Disney “Mouse Ears” on an advertisement, 
and later trying to claim it was an unintentional use of Disney’s logo.  Obviously, the major-
ity of registered trademarks are not nearly as famous or easily distinguishable as Disney’s, 
but using another company’s exact trademark, especially one in direct competition with 
your own business, should carry enough weight to establish rebuttable prima facie intent. 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/8
2012] THE LANHAM ACT AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 769 
D. Evidence of Actual Confusion 
In the Internet setting, evidence of actual confusion should be given 
even more weight due to the ease of overcoming initial interest confusion 
by merely clicking “back” on one’s web browser.  Most consumers proba-
bly would not go to the trouble of reporting their confusion, and would 
simply return to the search engine results and move to the next link on the 
list.  Therefore, if a company did present actual evidence of customer com-
plaints, even if in relatively small numbers compared to the number of 
searches queried on a particular keyword, such evidence would be indica-
tive of customers being so confused that they felt the need to complain to 
the company.  A user making that level of effort, when merely moving on 
to another website is so easy for the consumer, would speak volumes as to 
that customer’s confusion, and accordingly should be given great weight by 
a court. 
E. Marketing Channels Used 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent analysis96 in its Network Automation deci-
sion gives sound reasoning for eliminating any analysis of the marketing 
channels used in consideration of likelihood of confusion in trademark key-
ing.  Since companies who do not advertise on the Internet are the excep-
tion and not the rule,
97
 the Lanham Act could easily state in its text that 
“the Internet” was its own marketing channel and eliminate any additional 
analysis.  Further, since search engine advertising is an ever-evolving mar-
ketplace with new search engines constantly joining the fray, limiting a 
market channel definition to a particular search engine would require mul-
tiple infringement claims which would in turn increase the burden on the 
courts rather than lighten it. 
F. Type of Goods and the Degree of Care Likely to be Exercised by the 
Purchaser 
The Ninth Circuit also ruled in Network Automation “that the default 
degree of consumer care is becoming more heightened as the novelty of the 
Internet evaporates and online commerce becomes commonplace.”98  How-
ever, the court’s implication that consumer sophistication necessarily ele-
vates in direct correlation to the price of the good or service in question is 
 
 96. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 97. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 98. Id. at 1152. 
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flawed.
99
  Moore’s Law has consistently continued to play out in techno-
logical advances in the first decade of the 21
st
 Century, making increasingly 
complex technological devices cheaper and cheaper, and therefore more 
readily available to a broader spectrum of the population.
100
  In many ways, 
Internet search engines are the 21st century’s equivalent to the 20th centu-
ry’s Yellow Pages, and the vast majority of Americans use the Internet reg-
ularly.
101
  Assuming a level of sophistication in what has become such a 
routine practice for the majority of Americans seems unnecessary.  Instead, 
Sleekcraft’s assessment of a “typical buyer exercising ordinary caution”102 
still seems the appropriate standard. 
G. Likelihood of Expansion of the Product Lines 
Similar to consideration of marketing channels used,
103
 looking at a 
trademark holder’s intent of expanding into the infringing user’s similar 
product line bears no relevance to trademark keying.  As previously dis-
cussed,
104
 most infringement through trademark keying occurs through 
purposeful behavior of direct competitors.  As both companies are already 
directly competing, neither the trademark holder nor the alleged infringer 
has room in the marketplace to expand without directly conflicting the oth-
er.  At least for likelihood of confusion in trademark keying, likelihood of 
expansion should no longer be considered. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
To remedy the varied application of the Lanham Act, Congress should 
amend the law to bring it inline with the trademark infringement currently 
occurring online.  No longer limited to print advertisements and non-
competing companies using similar-sounding names, trademark infringe-
ment is now taking place in the unseen lines of text used to generate search 
engine query results. 
 
 99. See id. at 1153. 
 100. Moore’s Law states that the number of transistors able to fit in a square inch of in-
tegrated circuit doubles every two years, effectively cutting the cost of the same processing 
power by half at the same time.  Moore’s Law and Intel Innovation, INTEL, 
http://www.intel.com/about/companyinfo/museum/exhibits/moore.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 
2012). 
 101. Kim Severson, Digital Age is Slow to Arrive in Rural America, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 
17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/us/18broadband.html (stating that 72% of 
all Americans use the Internet). 
 102. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 103. See surpa Part V.E. 
 104. See id. 
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/8
2012] THE LANHAM ACT AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 771 
In the context of trademark terms and search engines, the Lanham Act 
has been applied inconsistently and unpredictably.  Acts that are considered 
infringing “use in commerce” in one jurisdiction are ruled not even to be 
commercial use that is subject to the Lanham Act in the other.
105
  And even 
when infringing use is found, the defense of fair use is applied by different 
standards based on varying tests to determine user confusion.
106
 
As a remedy, the Lanham Act should be updated to add language spe-
cifically defining the purchase or sale of a trademarked keyword as use in 
commerce, removing any possibility of fair use defense.  To achieve this, 
Congress would finally add the protection to trademarks on the Internet that 
courts have been unable to provide. 
Until Congress makes these changes, federal courts should re-evaluate 
the Sleekcraft likelihood of confusion factors,
107
 giving fresh eyes to the 
context of trademarked keywords on the Internet.  A more fair, and con-
sistent, application would be achieved by reducing the likelihood of confu-
sion analysis to the following factors: strength of the mark, similarity of the 
marks, the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, evidence of actual con-
fusion, types of goods, and the purchaser’s degree of care.  This reduction 
in factors would provide a more consistent application of likelihood of con-
fusion analysis and would give trademark holders better protection under 
the already existing language of the Lanham Act. 
M. Lee Taft 
 
 
 105. See supra notes 47–70. 
 106. See supra notes 12–28. 
 107. See supra note 8. 
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